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I. INTRODUCTION 
The inter-generational elasticity of income in the United States is estimated to be 0.5 or 
0.6, much higher than estimates for many other developed countries (Black and Devereux 2011). 
One hypothesis for why disadvantage is passed down from one generation to the next is that 
credit constraints cause poor parents to under-invest in children’s human capital (Becker and 
Tomes 1986), which, if true, suggests a straightforward policy solution: transfer more resources 
to poor families. While the US devotes fewer resources to anti-poverty income transfers than 
other developed nations (Smeeding 2006), we nonetheless have the same desire for anti-poverty 
programs to enhance long-term productivity, and not simply alleviate short-term material need. 
In announcing the War on Poverty in 1964, for example, President Lyndon B. Johnson argued: 
“Very often a lack of jobs and money is not the cause of poverty, but the symptom. The cause 
may lie deeper in our failure to give our fellow citizens a fair chance to develop their own 
capacities, in a lack of education and training, in a lack of medical care and housing…” 
Several recent influential studies suggest that anti-poverty programs may have an even 
higher return in educational outcomes than best-practice educational interventions, which if 
correct would imply there is no tradeoff to government between helping the poor in the short 
term and reducing inter-generational poverty in the long term. For example, Dahl and Lochner 
(2012) examine the effects of expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) during the 1990s 
and estimate that an extra $1,000 in family income (in 2013 dollars)1 raises children’s test scores 
by 0.045 standard deviations (SD) overall, by 0.06 for black or Hispanic youth, and by 0.065 for 
males. Duncan, Morris, and Rodrigues (2011) estimate similar impacts using data from several 
welfare-to-work experiments. Milligan and Stabile (2011) find even larger impacts in Canada, 
                                                
1 Unless otherwise noted, all dollar amounts reported in this paper are in 2013 inflation-adjusted dollars. The 
estimates we report in text are slightly different from those reported in the original papers we cite because we have 
re-scaled their estimates to reflect the effect per $1,000 in constant 2013 dollars. 
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where $1,000 in extra child-care benefits increases math scores by 0.05 SD overall and 0.177 SD 
for boys. Akee et al. (2010) study the effects of income received by low-income Native 
American families from the opening of a casino on tribal land in North Carolina. Their reduced-
form effect corresponds to an income change of $4,000, and implies that an extra $1,000 
increases high school graduation by about 6 percentage points in the poorest families. Few if any 
educational interventions produce gains per dollar spent of these magnitudes. 
However, the literature on the relationship between family income and child outcomes is 
controversial, owing largely to the challenge of disentangling causal effects from unobserved 
factors. Whatever makes it difficult for parents to succeed in the labor market may also adversely 
affect the development of their children. In that case, simply transferring resources to poor 
parents may not be enough to help poor children; what may be required is an intervention that 
targets the family attributes that drive the correlation between income and child outcomes, or a 
direct provision of educational services that compensate for what disadvantaged children are 
otherwise not receiving. The best empirical studies in this literature, such as those mentioned 
above, try to overcome this identification challenge by studying the effects of transfer programs 
that change the resources available to families. This strategy is complicated by the fact that most 
of America’s largest transfer programs are entitlements available to all eligible people. 
In this paper, we estimate the impact of an unusually generous US social program—
means-tested housing assistance—on important long-run outcomes of children. We take 
advantage of a large housing voucher lottery that was carried out in Chicago in July 1997, when 
for the first time in a dozen years the city began accepting applications again for the voucher 
program.2 A total of 82,607 eligible people applied; by way of comparison there were about 
                                                
2 We use “housing voucher” as shorthand for tenant-based rental subsidies. See Appendix A for a discussion.  
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300,000 households in poverty in Chicago at the time.3 The number of applicants was far greater 
than the number of vouchers so applicants were randomly assigned to a wait list. We show below 
that this assignment was indeed random and greatly affected the chance a family was offered a 
voucher.4 We are able to link applicants to a wide range of local, state, and federal administrative 
databases that allow us to measure outcomes for children in these families up to 14 years after 
the voucher lottery, including standardized test scores, high school graduation, arrest rates, 
earnings, and social welfare receipt as adults, and health outcomes from Medicaid claims data. 
Our study focuses on the 90 percent of applicants living in unsubsidized private housing 
at the time of the lottery, for which a housing voucher represents a large, positive real income 
shock. The voucher allows these families to consume additional housing, but also allows them to 
consume more of other goods because it substantially reduces the fraction of their income they 
must contribute to rent. Our study thus answers a different question from that of the Moving to 
Opportunity (MTO) demonstration, which offered housing vouchers to families living in public 
housing. Families in MTO who were offered a voucher received a different form of housing 
assistance that allowed them to move to different neighborhoods, but did not directly change the 
resources available to families because the program rules for public housing and housing 
vouchers are identical in terms of the income eligibility limits and required rent contributions.5 
Our study makes two important contributions. First, to the best of our knowledge, it is the 
first study of housing vouchers to use a credibly exogenous source of variation and to examine 
the long-term outcomes of a large sample of children using rich administrative data. There has 
                                                
3 In 2000 there were ~2.9 million people in Chicago, with an average of 2.67 people per household and a poverty 
rate in the city equal to 28.5 percent. http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2003/11/livingcities-chicago 
4 Shea’s (2000, p. 182) paper on this topic notes that “perhaps future researchers will focus on more convincingly 
exogenous sources of parental income variation, such as lottery winnings or large changes in public transfers.” We 
essentially combine both of these sources of variation. 
5 Results of the 5-year MTO follow are in Kling, Ludwig, and Katz (2005), Sanbonmatsu et al. (2006), and Kling, 
Liebman, and Katz (2007), while long-term results are in Sanbonmatsu et al. (2011) and Ludwig et al. (2011, 2012).  
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been one other randomized study of housing vouchers (Mills et al. 2006), but it has only modest 
sample sizes and relies on parents’ reports of children’s outcomes (see Appendix B for more 
details).6 This dearth of evidence is surprising given the scale of low-income housing programs, 
which receive $40 billion in federal spending each year—more than the total spending on Title I 
or Pell Grant programs in education, and over twice as much as is spent on cash welfare (Falk 
2012). Despite this sizable budget, housing programs are very costly per recipient, so only one-
quarter of income-eligible families participate (Rice and Sard 2009). Families with children are a 
key target population and make up half of all participants in the voucher program. 
Second, we shed new light on how means-tested transfer programs generally affect 
children’s human capital and long-term life outcomes. Housing vouchers greatly increase the 
disposable cash available to families by reducing the amount they must contribute toward rent. 
The distinction between housing vouchers and cash transfers is further narrowed because poor 
families tend to spend a sizable share of their income on housing. Relative to most prior studies, 
ours includes a very large sample, a randomized research design, long-term follow-up, and the 
ability to examine multiple child outcomes (e.g., schooling, crime, and health). Moreover, the 
housing voucher we study is extremely generous. The average subsidy for our sample is over 
$12,000, sizable compared to the average income of our sample ($19,000). The low average 
income of our sample also means we focus on the part of the income distribution where effects 
should be largest (Løken, Mogstad, and Wiswall 2012). We also use administrative data to 
                                                
6 Mills et al. (2006) has a sample of N = 2,481. Their confidence intervals do not allow them to reject effects of 
treatment on the treated (TOT) smaller than about 8 percent of a standard deviation (SD) for highest grade 
completed, about 25 percent SD for whether the child has ever been suspended or expelled in school, and about 30 
percent SD for the behavior problems index (Mills et al. 2006, Exhibits 6.3 and 6.4). In terms of measuring 
outcomes, Theunissen et al. (1998) compare child and parent reports about the child’s physical health, cognitive 
functioning, social functioning, and emotions and find correlations between 0.44 and 0.61. 
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measure outcomes, which have low rates of sample attrition and may be less susceptible to self-
reporting error than surveys. 
We find few statistically significant effects of housing vouchers on children’s schooling 
outcomes, crime, or health, none of which are significant once we account for multiple 
hypothesis testing. Our estimates are also much smaller than what we would expect based on the 
results of recent studies of the effects of cash transfers. Even if we make the extreme assumption 
that additional housing consumption has no effect on children’s outcomes, our confidence 
intervals rule out effects of income on outcomes like test scores for male children that are larger 
than one-third the size of those in Dahl and Lochner (2012) and one-eighth those in Milligan and 
Stabile (2011). The confidence interval around our estimate for income effects on high school 
graduation rates for males lets us rule out effects larger than about one-quarter of Akee et al. 
(2010). We get qualitatively similar findings if we restrict attention to just those infra-marginal 
families whose baseline housing consumption is equal to what is essentially the voucher’s 
maximum rent; for these families receipt of a voucher is very close to being a pure cash transfer.  
The main threat to internal validity with these results is from a slight treatment-control 
difference in migration out of the Chicago Public Schools, which could, in theory, bias our 
estimates of the education outcomes. However, as we show below, the amount of differential 
attrition is extremely small and a variety of sensitivity analyses suggest that any resulting bias is 
negligible. Moreover, we find no differential attrition from Illinois, which means that our crime 
and health outcomes (which come from state agency data) should not suffer from any such bias. 
Our estimates also imply that extra cash transfers beyond the current level provided in the 
US are likely to have a smaller impact (per dollar) than the best-practice educational 
interventions explicitly designed to improve children’s human capital. These findings are 
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consistent with Currie’s (2006) observation that in-kind programs targeted at specific outcome 
domains for poor children (in this case, education) are more effective than “a cash program that 
is not targeted at any particular outcome” (p. 3). Since the effect of income on children’s 
outcomes is surely non-linear, our estimates do not imply that abandoning the existing system of 
social supports to children in the US would not harm their outcomes. 
 The next section discusses the program rules for housing vouchers and the candidate 
mechanisms through which receipt of a housing voucher might affect children’s outcomes. 
Section III provides background on the 1997 housing voucher lottery that serves as the basis for 
our empirical analysis. Sections IV and V discuss our data and empirical strategy. Our results are 
in Section VI, while the limitations and implications of our results are in Section VII. 
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
In this section, we first describe how the housing voucher program works, and then 
discuss how participation in the housing voucher program might influence childhood outcomes.  
A. Housing program rules 
Housing vouchers subsidize low-income families to live in private-market housing.7 
Eligibility limits for housing programs are a function of family size and income, and prioritize 
what the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) terms “very low-income 
households,” with incomes for a family of four below 50 percent of the local median.  
The maximum subsidy available to families is governed by the Fair Market Rent (FMR), 
which is partly a function of family size (larger families get a higher FMR to lease a larger rental 
unit). The FMR is also linked to the local metropolitan area’s private-market rent distribution, 
                                                
7 This discussion is based on the excellent summary in Olsen (2003). 
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usually set at the 40th or 50th percentile, and so varies over time and across areas.8  
Families receiving vouchers are required to contribute towards rent 30 percent of their 
adjusted income, which under program rules can be substantially less than total income. The 
voucher covers the difference between the family’s rent contribution and the lesser of the FMR 
or the unit rent. Voucher recipients can keep the subsidy for as long as they meet income and 
other eligibility requirements.9 For additional details about housing voucher rules, and how they 
interact with other social programs, see Appendix A.  
B. Mechanisms through which housing vouchers might affect child outcomes 
Receipt of a housing voucher may influence children’s long-term outcomes in three 
possible ways: 1) by improving the quality of the housing conditions in which children reside; 2) 
by allowing parents to invest more in non-housing goods that may be developmentally 
productive for children; and 3) by reducing parental labor supply. 
Figure I presents the budget constraint facing families that are trying to decide how to 
allocate income I between the consumption of housing (H) and other (non-housing) goods (C), 
both normalized so that PH = PC = 1. Consider a family at baseline with budget constraint DJ 
that, prior to receiving a voucher, locates at point B. After receiving a voucher subsidy with a 
cost to the government of S (in our sample, on average S = $12,501), their new budget constraint 
is given by DUVL, where D – CV is the rent contribution required by the voucher program. If the 
family leases a unit with rent up to the FMR, their new consumption bundle is at point V.  
 Increased consumption of housing 
                                                
8 The FMR for a two-bedroom apartment in the Chicago area, in nominal dollars, equaled $699 in 1994, $732 in 
1997, and $762 in 2000.  
9 Families using a voucher undergo annual examinations of their income and household composition by their local 
Public Housing Authority (PHA). These examinations determine the family’s continued eligibility and establish the 
housing assistance payment (HAP) made by the PHA on the family’s behalf. If a family’s income rises to the point 
where their HAP is zero, they may continue to be enrolled for six months at which point, if the subsidy is not 
restored, their contract will terminate. 
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The most obvious change for a family receiving a housing voucher is that their housing 
consumption increases substantially, from HB to HV. For families in our study, average annual 
rent at baseline is $9,372 (Table I), while the FMR for these families is on average $16,220, so 
the maximum change in housing consumption from using a voucher is on average HV – HB = 
$6,849. This represents a 73 percent increase in housing consumption, or about 36 percent of the 
average baseline income of our families ($18,978). 
Figure II gives some sense for the distribution of HV – HB across families that leased up 
with a voucher, estimated as the rent recorded by the government the first time the household 
uses a voucher minus our estimate for their baseline (pre-lottery) rent.10 The distribution includes 
some negative changes in rent (housing consumption) from using a housing voucher, which 
could occur in the short run (as we are examining here) but should dissipate in the long run as 
housing consumption rises for all voucher recipients.11 If housing markets function at all well, 
we would expect higher-rent units to be either higher quality or located in more desirable 
neighborhoods. We show below that in practice families do not move to notably “better” 
neighborhoods, so most of the increase in housing consumption presumably comes from 
improved housing units as suggested by Mills et al. (2006).12  
                                                
10 Actual baseline rent is unobserved in our data. Instead, we assign to each family the average rent paid by 
demographically-similar households in their baseline census tract using a special tabulation of 2000 Census data 
from Chicago conducted for us by the Census Bureau. See Appendix D for details. 
11 In the short run, we could see declines in housing consumption (market rent) among those families who are living 
at baseline in apartments with rents close to or above the FMR. The housing voucher program provides families with 
a limited amount of time to find a new unit. Previous research suggests that not all landlords are willing to lease 
units to families with vouchers because of minimum housing quality restrictions (and inspections), paperwork, and 
other program requirements. A family with a baseline rent close to the FMR might move into a unit with lower rent 
in the short run because of these search constraints. In the long run, we expect families to adjust and re-optimize. 
12 Some observers have noted landlords are aware of the rent limits in the voucher program and some artificially 
raise the rent of a unit to meet the tenant’s new ability to pay (Mallach 2007; Collinson and Ganong 2013). To the 
extent that this is the case, the estimates described above may overstate the increase in housing consumption. The 
welfare-to-work voucher study by Mills et al. (2006) suggests that even if this occurs to some degree, the net effect 
of housing voucher receipt may be an increase in unit quality or size. For example, the share of families in the 
control group that live in crowded housing conditions (more than one person per bedroom) at the time of their 
follow-up survey is about 39 percent, while the effect of voucher use (the TOT effect) is minus 22 percentage points 
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A large correlational literature has found that at least some specific features of housing 
units, like presence of toxins or crowding, are associated with outcomes such as respiratory 
problems in children (Leventhal and Newman 2010).13 Few studies are able to control for 
unobserved family attributes that may confound estimates of housing effects on children. One 
exception is Currie and Yelowitz (2000), who use the sex composition of children in a family as 
an instrument for receipt of public housing and find that families in housing projects experience 
less overcrowding, and children, especially males, are less likely to be held back in school. 
 Increased consumption of other goods 
Receipt of a housing voucher also allows a family to greatly increase their spending on 
non-housing goods (from CB to CV in Figure I) by reducing out-of-pocket spending on rent. Our 
sample spends on average $9,372 on rent at baseline, over half their total income.14 Receipt of a 
voucher would let the average family in our sample reduce out-of-pocket spending on housing to 
D – CV = $3,719 (the average required rent contribution by the voucher program), resulting in 
average increased consumption of other non-housing goods of CV – CB = $5,653, which equals 
45 percent of the total voucher subsidy cost to the government and 29 percent of average 
baseline income for families. This represents a 59 percent gain in non-housing consumption. 
While a large body of research has studied the relationship between income and 
children’s outcomes (e.g., Brooks-Gunn and Duncan 1997; Mayer 1997; see also Appendix B), 
                                                                                                                                                       
(p<.05); see Table 5.3 of Mills et al. 2006, p. 139. Similarly, the share of control group families reporting two or 
more housing problems is 13.5 percent, and the TOT is again about one-half that (minus 7 percentage points), 
although is not quite significant.   
13 For example, Fisk et al. (2007) find building dampness and mold to be associated with a 30-50 percent increase in 
respiratory and asthma-related outcomes, while Sharfstein et al. (2001) survey families on a Section 8 waiting list in 
Boston and find that nearly half of respondents report that their children suffered health problems, ranging from 
mental distress to asthma, as a consequence of substandard housing conditions. For a discussion of other studies of 
housing vouchers that mix together the different mechanisms examined here, see Appendix B. 
14 Nationwide, nearly two-thirds of extremely low-income renters, defined as those with incomes below 30 percent 
of area median income, spend half or more of their income on housing. Nearly 80 percent of these families spend at 
least 30 percent of their income on housing. Among all renter households, around one-quarter spend at least half 
their income on housing, and over one-half spend at least 30 percent of their incomes on housing (Bipartisan Policy 
Center 2013, p. 83). 
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credibly identified estimates are rare. As Almond and Currie (2011) note, “it is…remarkably 
difficult to find examples of policies that increase incomes without potentially having a direct 
effect on outcomes.” In addition to the research focused exclusively on academic outcomes of 
children (e.g., Dahl and Lochner 2012), Milligan and Stabile (2011) find that an extra child-care 
benefit resulted in improved physical health in males and mental health in females. Using 
variation in the rollout of the Food Stamp Program, Almond et al. (2011) find exposure to Food 
Stamps in the later stages of pregnancy increases birth weight. 
Compared to a housing voucher of cost S to the government, an equally costly cash 
transfer would lead a recipient to consume less housing and more non-housing goods (point X, in 
Figure I) compared to the voucher bundle V. Which of these two consumption bundles would be 
more developmentally productive for children depends on how developmentally productive 
housing is compared to whatever else parents would spend extra cash on instead. While voters 
must think housing is better than cash for at least some aspects of well-being (hence the 
provision of an in-kind rather than a cash benefit), it seems safe to assume that an upper bound 
for the effects of a housing voucher on children is the effect of a similarly costly cash transfer. 
To better understand how our results compare to those from existing studies of cash 
transfers, we generate a set of lower bound estimates for the implied effect of income on child 
outcomes under the (probably extreme) assumption that a dollar of housing and a dollar of non-
housing consumption are equally helpful for children. We also calculate an upper bound for the 
effect of income on child outcomes by making an equally extreme assumption in the other 
direction, namely that additional housing has no impact on children’s outcomes so that the effect 
of a housing voucher on children comes entirely from the change induced in non-housing 
consumption. Specifically, we estimate the size of the cash transfer that would lead to the same 
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gain in non-housing goods as families get from receiving a voucher (CV – CB in Figure III, 
represented by S*). The required cash transfer is larger than just the gain in non-housing 
consumption under the voucher, because when families get extra cash (e.g., through the EITC) 
they will likely choose to spend a portion of it on housing. We assume an income elasticity of 
housing of 0.35 (Mayo 1981; Polinsky and Ellwood 1979), which implies S* = $6,377.15 This 
elasticity is towards the lower end of the range of estimates, which in turn yields a lower S* than 
would result from assuming a larger elasticity. 
Reduction in parental labor supply 
Housing vouchers may also affect child outcomes by reducing parental labor supply 
through both income effects (given the large resource transfer) and substitution effects (from the 
fact that they require families to contribute 30 percent of adjusted income towards rent). The net 
effect for our Chicago sample is to reduce work rates by about 4.6 percentage points, versus a 
control mean of 60 percent (Jacob and Ludwig 2012). Whether increased parental time with 
children increases or decreases human capital depends on how the developmental productivity of 
parental time compares with the alternative way children would have spent their time. 
Compared to housing vouchers, other transfer programs may have different effects on 
parental labor supply depending on their design. If parents combine time and market goods to 
“produce” children’s human capital, as in Becker (1965), then the effect of a transfer program on 
parental labor supply could change the way parents use extra cash to help their children and so 
moderate the effect of any cash transfer on children’s outcomes (see Appendix C). This provides 
one explanation for why the results in Duncan et al. (2011), who study the effects of welfare-to-
                                                
15 We can calculate S* in practice with the income elasticity of housing consumption (eH,I), baseline income (I), 
together with consumption patterns before and after voucher receipt (HB, CB, and CV), using the fact that: 
 𝐶! −   𝐶! =   𝑆∗ −    [  !∗! ×𝑒!,!×𝐻!]  
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work programs that increase parental labor supply, differ from the effects we estimate of housing 
vouchers that slightly reduce parental labor supply. We return to this point in the discussion. 
III. THE CHICAGO HOUSING VOUCHER LOTTERY 
In July 1997, Chicago Housing Authority Corporation (CHAC) opened the city’s voucher 
wait list for the first time in 12 years, and received a total of 82,607 applications from income-
eligible people. CHAC hired Abt Associates to randomly assign applicants to a waiting list in 
August 1997, and notified those in the top 35,000 positions of their wait list number. CHAC told 
these families on the “active wait list” that they would be offered a voucher within three years. 
CHAC informed the remaining applicants (lottery numbers 35,001 to 82,607) that they would 
not receive vouchers.16 By May 2003, after offering vouchers to 18,110 families from this wait 
list, CHAC was “over-leased,” that is, had issued as many or more vouchers than it had funding 
to pay for, and essentially stopped offering any new vouchers.17 
In the analysis that follows, we define our treatment group to be families offered 
vouchers by May 2003 (lottery numbers 1 to 18,110). The control group consists of applicants 
with lottery numbers above 35,000 who were told that they were not on the active wait list and 
would not get a voucher. We exclude families with lottery numbers between 18,110 and 35,000 
from our primary sample because of their ambiguous treatment status.18  
IV. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 This section briefly describes the key data sources used in our analysis. For more detail 
                                                
16 Service of the July 1997 wait list was interrupted in August 1998, as CHAC was required to provide vouchers to a 
set of Latino families in response to a discrimination lawsuit against the City of Chicago. CHAC began to serve the 
1997 wait list again at the start of 2000. 
17 The number of families offered vouchers per year (and the voucher utilization rate) was 1,540 (50.3 percent) in 
1997; 3,085 in 1998 (50.1 percent); 2,631 in 2000 (43.6 percent); 5,733 (44.5 percent) in 2001; 4,674 (49.7 percent) 
in 2002; 446 (42.7 percent) in 2003. 
18 Families in this group could have been affected by the anticipation of receiving a voucher in the future, although 
since CHAC stopped giving out vouchers in 2003 these families may have given up hope of getting one. Appendix 
Table I shows that including this group does not change our main findings. 
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on the data, including variable construction and matching, see Appendix D. The starting point for 
constructing our sample are the application forms for the 1997 wait list, which provide baseline 
information on the 82,607 adults and nearly 8,700 spouses who applied to CHAC for a housing 
voucher. The baseline application forms do not include the names of other household residents, 
so we use data from the Illinois Department of Human Services (IDHS) to determine who lived 
with the CHAC applicants in the period immediately before the wait list was opened. 
Data on voucher utilization comes from HUD 50058 records, which families complete 
annually to verify program eligibility. Several methods were used to track residential locations 
for both treatment and control group families, which are then linked to census tract-level data. 
To measure behavioral outcomes, we use longitudinal administrative data from a number 
of different government agencies. All of our administrative data matching uses only information 
from pre-randomization sources to preserve the strength of the experimental design. From the 
Chicago Public Schools (CPS) we obtained student-level school records for the academic years 
1994-5 through 2010-11 that include test scores, grades, and enrollment or graduation status. We 
measure labor market involvement for youth and their parents using quarterly earnings data from 
the state unemployment insurance (UI) system through 2011:Q4. We measure social program 
participation of youth and parents from IDHS records through 2013:Q1. We measure criminal 
behavior using data from the Illinois State Police (ISP) that capture arrests through 2012:Q1. 
Finally, we measure health outcomes using Medicaid claims data from the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for the period from 1999:Q1 through 2008:Q4. One 
limitation of the Medicaid data is that most, but not everyone, in our study sample uses 
Medicaid. A second limitation is that we measure health outcomes only when a fee-for-service 
claim is filed, and some children in our sample receive benefits from a managed care 
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organization (MCO) that does not generate such claims (although there is no treatment-control 
difference in propensity to receive benefits from an MCO). All results derived from claims that 
we present below are conditioned on being enrolled in fee-for-service care for six or more 
months during the academic year. Using this definition of enrollment, approximately 75% of our 
sample is ever enrolled at some point during 2000-2008, and 45% are enrolled at a point in time, 
with at most a 1.4 percentage point treatment-control difference in enrollment rates as we show 
below. A third limitation is that claims data could confound access to care with health outcomes; 
we try to address this by focusing on conditions for which most people would seek care. 
Sample 
Table I presents summary baseline statistics for our main analysis sample—children of 
CHAC applicants living in private-market housing when they applied to the voucher lottery, 
separately for the 48,263 “control” children (whose families were not offered vouchers) and 
18,347 “treatment” children (offered vouchers during 1997-2003) in our sample. We restrict our 
attention to children who were age 0-18 at the time of the 1997 lottery, and so do not include any 
children born subsequent to the lottery since fertility could be affected by voucher receipt. 
Our program population is quite disadvantaged at baseline. Almost all families are 
headed by an unmarried, African-American woman, with nearly four out of five receiving some 
form of social-program assistance. The year before the lottery children have an average GPA of 
1.5 on a 4 point scale, and attend schools that are overwhelmingly attended by other minority 
students who are eligible for free or reduced price lunch. 
Comparing the baseline average characteristics of the control group (column 1 of Table I) 
with the treatment group (column 2) provides some evidence to confirm that the voucher lottery 
was indeed random. A few pair-wise comparisons are statistically significant, but an omnibus 
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test of the null hypothesis that all of the treatment-control differences in baseline characteristics 
are jointly zero yields a p-value of .49.19 
V. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 Given that the voucher lottery was random, a simple comparison of means between those 
offered vouchers and those who were not will provide an unbiased estimate of the effects of 
being offered a voucher, known as the “intention to treat” (ITT) effect. We discuss here how we 
estimate the ITT and the effects of actually using a voucher, and how we handle statistical 
inference with so many different outcomes. 
A. The Effect of Receiving a Voucher Offer 
Our data consist of a balanced panel where the unit of observation is the child-year. To 
facilitate comparison between education and crime data, we use academic years that span from 
Q3 of one year to Q2 of the following year. Our analysis period runs from 1997-98 through 
2010-11, the last year for which we have most of our data sources. For child i in year t, we use 
OLS to estimate the ITT effect on outcome 𝑦!" as:  
(1) 𝑦!" = 𝛼 + 𝛽! 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟!" + 𝛽! 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟!" + 𝑋𝛤 + 𝛾! +   𝜀!" 
PostOfferit equals 1 if the family of child i has been offered a housing voucher through 
the CHAC 1997 lottery in any period up to or including t, and zero otherwise. We also control 
for year effects, 𝛾!, and to increase precision we control for a set of baseline characteristics (see 
Appendix D). Standard errors are clustered by household (Bertrand et al. 2004). Identification of 
the ITT effect 𝛽!  comes from a within-period comparison of the average outcomes of those 
                                                
19 We use the suest command in Stata to conduct an F-test for the joint significance of the treatment indicator, 
adjusting for the non-independence of baseline characteristics within households. This test essentially consists of 
regressing lottery numbers against all of the baseline characteristics shown in Table I in a way that accounts for the 
correlation among these baseline variables. An alternative approach is to cluster standard errors on baseline census 
tract rather than household ID; when we do this, the p-value is 0.44. The set of baseline variables we examine in our 
omnibus test includes indicators for whether selected baseline measures are missing; when we replicate our omnibus 
tests excluding those missing indicators, the p-values (equal to 0.49 and 0.33 for clustering at the household or tract 
levels, respectively) still fail to reach traditional thresholds of significance. 
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offered vouchers versus the control group. If there is heterogeneity in the effects of a voucher 
offer across people, calendar time, or duration of voucher receipt, then our ITT estimate is an 
average of the ITT effects across all post-voucher-offer person-years in our panel. We also 
include an indicator, PreOfferit, equal to 1 for people who were on the active wait list but had not 
been offered vouchers yet by year t, and equal to 0 otherwise. The coefficient provides evidence 
on whether families change their behavior in anticipation of getting a voucher. Note that this 
coefficient does not serve as a “randomization check,” since it is estimated off of post-
randomization treatment-control differences (recall our panel only includes post-lottery quarters). 
The standard “education production function” in economics assumes children’s outcomes 
are affected by the accumulated inputs they have experienced up to that point (see for example 
Hanushek 1979), which suggests that the effects of increased household resources may 
accumulate and grow over time. So also of interest for our analysis is to examine how voucher 
effects might change with the duration of voucher receipt. To do this, we use OLS to estimate the 
per-period ITT effect using the following event study-style specification: 
(2) 𝑦!" = 𝛼 + 𝐷!"!𝛿!! + 𝑋𝛤 + 𝛾! + 𝜀!" , 
The key explanatory variables in this case are indicators (𝐷!"! ) equal to 1 if, in period t, 
individual i is k years from when they were offered a voucher through the lottery (k can take on 
positive and negative values). We present figures tracing out the time path of these effects below. 
The ITT effect could change over time because the behavioral response to leasing up with a 
voucher varies, or because the fraction or composition of families that have leased up with a 
voucher changes over time, or because of changes in economic, policy, or other social 
conditions. We explore some of these sources of heterogeneity below. 
B. The Effects of Using a Voucher 
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 The ITT estimate will not equal the effect of using a voucher because not all treatment-
group families who were offered a voucher used them, and a small share of controls received a 
housing voucher through some other special allocation during our study period (between 5 and 8 
percent, as shown below).20 Under the assumption that the voucher offer does not have an impact 
on those who choose not to take it, we can use two-stage least squares with randomized voucher 
offers as an instrument to estimate the effects of using a voucher with equations (3) and (4). The 
dependent variable in equation (3) is an indicator for whether household i utilized a voucher 
provided by any source (the CHAC lottery or some other allocation) by or in period t.21  
(3) 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑!" = 𝛼 + 𝜃!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟!" +   𝜃!𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟!" + 𝑋𝛤 + 𝛾! + 𝜀!" 
(4) 𝑦!" = 𝜂 +   𝜋!𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑!" + 𝑋𝛱 +   𝜇! +   𝑣!" 
Because a small share of families assigned to the bottom of the 1997 CHAC wait list 
wind up receiving vouchers through some other program during our study period, our estimate 
for 𝜋! captures the local average treatment effect on those induced to use a voucher by their 
CHAC wait list position (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996).22 As a benchmark for judging the 
size of our IV estimates, we present what Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001) call the control 
complier mean (CCM), or the average outcome for controls who would have used vouchers had 
                                                
20 Among the other sources of housing vouchers during our study period was the HOPE VI program, through which 
HUD financed CHA to demolish some of the city’s most notorious housing projects; some of the displaced families 
were offered vouchers through a special allocation. Other families on the CHAC wait-list could have received 
vouchers from another program because they contained a disabled member, or were at risk for having parents 
separated from children without a change in housing status, or were Latino and so received vouchers as a result of 
litigation by Latinos United against the CHA that interrupted service of the 1997 wait-list for several years. 
21 Under this definition a family that uses but then gives up their voucher does not become “untreated,” under the 
assumption that a child’s outcomes are a function of current and past investments. In practice, over half of 
households who lease up with a CHAC voucher remain leased-up after eight years (Appendix Figure I). The results 
do not change much if we instead define the endogenous explanatory variable of interest as “using a housing 
voucher in period t.” 
22 If voucher effects instead vary by how long a family is leased up, then π1 captures the LATE for those who lease 
up for a longer period of time due to treatment group assignment, so long as we are willing to assume that control 
group cross-overs would have been leased up for at least as much time had they been assigned to treatment. If we 
instead calculated our IV estimate using a more conservative assumption that all treatment group voucher users lease 
up for a longer period of time than if they had been assigned to the control group, our IV estimate will capture the 
effects of treatment-on-the-treated (TOT).  
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they been assigned to the treatment group. We calculate this using the formula from Heller et al. 
(2013) to account for the presence of control crossovers.  
Table II shows there is a large “first-stage” relationship between being offered a housing 
voucher through the CHAC lottery and whether the child’s family used a voucher. Our estimate 
for 𝜃! is nonetheless less than 1; despite the long wait list for housing vouchers, many families 
offered vouchers do not wind up using them. Reasons include the fact that many apartments have 
rents above the FMR limit, some landlords may avoid renting to voucher families,23 and families 
offered vouchers have a limited time (usually 2 to 4 months) to use the voucher to lease a unit. In 
the top panel, which presents results for our full analysis sample, column 1 shows the coefficient 
on the PostOffer indicator from estimating equation (3). Around 7 percent of controls used a 
voucher, and assignment of a wait list number below 18,110 increased voucher lease-up rates by 
48 percentage points. The F-test statistic equals 5,835. The voucher take-up rate we report here is 
consistent with those reported in previous studies.24 The results are qualitatively similar if we 
estimate a cross-section regression for whether a child’s family ever uses a voucher while CHAC 
was issuing vouchers (1997-2003), as in column 2, or if we focus on using a voucher from the 
1997 CHAC lottery specifically (columns 3 and 4).  
C. Comparison to Estimated Effects of Cash Transfers 
While the ITT and TOT estimates tell us about the effects of the housing voucher 
program on children’s outcomes, we are also interested in comparing our results to the broader 
                                                
23 Some landlords may avoid renting to voucher families because of the paperwork requirements, the program’s 
minimum housing quality standards (which must be verified by an inspection, although failed units can be modified 
and re-inspected), and a previous rule that has since been abolished that limited the ability of landlords to turn away 
future voucher applicants (“take one, take all”). 
24 By comparison, Finkel and Buron (2001) study 48 public housing agencies around the country and find an overall 
voucher lease-up rate of 69 percent in 2000, with lower rates in big cities such as New York (57 percent) and Los 
Angeles (47 percent). In the Gautreaux mobility program in Chicago, around 19 percent of the public housing 
families who signed up used a voucher (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000, p. 67). Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007) 
report that in the MTO experiment, 47 percent of families assigned to the experimental (low-poverty) voucher group 
lease-up, as do 60 percent of those assigned to the regular Section 8 voucher group. See also Olsen (2003).  
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literature on cash transfers, in which results are typically reported in terms of benefits per $1,000 
of additional income. We do this under different assumptions about whether housing is as 
productive for children as non-housing consumption to bound the estimated effects. 
We first assume that a dollar of housing and a dollar of non-housing consumption are 
equally productive for children’s outcomes. To do this we replace Leasedit as the endogenous 
explanatory variable in equations (3) and (4) with Leasedit × Si, where Si is a measure of the size 
of the voucher subsidy family i was eligible for calculated using baseline (pre-lottery) data, and 
shown in 2013 dollars (see Appendix E). This rescales the TOT by the average S in our sample 
($12,501), so 𝜋!"#! ≈ !!! . Dividing the TOT by an upper bound for the plausible cash equivalent 
value of a voucher provides a lower bound estimate for 𝜋!"#! . 
We then assume that housing consumption has no developmentally productive effects on 
children’s human capital, so that any effect on children’s outcomes caused by the voucher 
operates entirely by increasing non-housing consumption. As described above (see Figure III), 
we estimate that the average cash transfer that would generate the same gain in non-housing 
consumption as families in our sample experience from receipt of a housing voucher equals S* = 
$6,377. Dividing the TOT by a lower bound for the plausible cash equivalent value of a voucher 
yields an upper bound estimate for 𝜋!"#! . In our tables we also show an even more extreme 
upper bound that assumes both that housing is unproductive for children and that the income 
elasticity of housing equals zero. In this case we rescale the TOT by the increase in non-housing 
consumption families experience from voucher receipt, equal on average in our sample to ΔC = 
CV – CB = $5,653.  
D. Multiple Hypothesis Testing 
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The final issue we discuss is how to account for the large number of outcomes we can 
examine with our data, and how to manage the risks of both false positives and false negatives. 
Our approach follows what we believe to be the “best practice” (Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007; 
Anderson 2008; Schochet et al. 2008) although, as Anderson (2008) shows, relatively few 
studies in the social sciences make such adjustments. 
First, we pre-specify a limited set of outcomes and subgroups for a main, confirmatory 
analysis. We focus on four outcomes: (i) high school graduation; (ii) a composite of math and 
reading achievement scores; (iii) the social cost of crimes committed by youth, an “importance-
weighted” index that assigns a dollar value representing the cost to society to each youth arrest 
based on estimates from the literature;25 and (iv) emergency department and inpatient hospital 
admissions. Given prior evidence that social policy effects may differ by gender (Kling, Ludwig, 
and Katz 2005; Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007; Anderson 2008), we examined impacts 
separately by gender. We also look separately at children 0-6 versus 6-18 years of age at the time 
of the lottery, given the possibility of declining developmental plasticity by age (Shonkoff and 
Phillips 2000; Knudsen et al. 2006) and the findings of Morris et al. (2004) and Duncan et al. 
(2011) that income only impacts achievement in young children. 
Second, in addition to reporting per comparison p-values from standard t-tests, we also 
control for the false discovery rate (FDR), or the proportion of null-hypothesis rejections that are 
Type I errors or “false positives,” using the two-step procedure from Benjamini, Krieger, and 
                                                
25 We follow the approach in Kling, Ludwig, and Katz (2005), discussed further in Appendix D. In Appendix Tables 
V-VIII, we conduct sensitivity analyses that examine what happens to our estimates if we trim the dollar value for 
the social costs of homicide (which tends to be much higher than other offenses and so can drive estimates using this 
sort of dollar-weighted index), setting its value to twice that of the next-highest crime, or set the estimated social 
costs of drug possession offenses to zero. Our appendix tables also show results separately for arrests by offense 
type: violent, property, drug, and other. The results for these different measures are almost never statistically 
significant, with the exception of arrests to female youth aged 6-18 at baseline, for whom there is some indication 
that housing voucher receipt may be associated with an increase in arrests for violent crimes. 
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Yekutieli (2006). Because the TOT is basically just a re-scaled version of the ITT point estimate 
and standard error, with a similar t-statistic, we report the FDR-adjusted p-values for the ITT.  
Since ours is a standard “multiple end points” problem that arises when comparing some 
alternative program to status quo (see Benjamini and Hochberg 1995), where the decision about 
which is preferable will depend on the whole set of outcomes being compared and not on the 
significance of any single outcome, we think the FDR is the most appropriate adjustment for 
multiple comparisons. For completeness, we also control for the family-wise error rate (FWER), 
or the probability of making any Type I error, calculated using a free step-down re-sampling 
method.26 The FWER is the more conservative of the two adjustments, so the fact that we find 
few statistically significant impacts even with our focus on the FDR strengthens our conclusions 
about the limited effect of even large resource transfers on children’s outcomes. 
VI. RESULTS 
 In this section, we present our findings on how housing vouchers affect child outcomes. 
We then discuss how these results inform the broader literature on income transfers. Finally, we 
explore a variety of mediating mechanisms through which vouchers might operate.  
A. Effects of Housing Vouchers on Children’s Outcomes 
 Table III presents the impact estimates for our primary outcome measures. Even if we 
initially ignore multiple testing issues and focus on pairwise error rates, just one out of twelve 
                                                
26 We use a bootstrap resampling technique that simulates data under the null hypothesis (Westfall and Young 1993; 
Anderson 2008). Within each permutation, we randomly re-assign treatment indicators with replacement and 
estimate program impacts on all of our primary outcome measures across our different sub-groups. By repeating this 
2,500 times, we create an empirical distribution of t-statistics that allows us to compare the actual set of t-statistics 
we find to what we would have found by chance under the null. We maintain the original sampling frame in each 
iteration, assigning the same number of pseudo-treatment and pseudo-control youth as in our original sample. This 
technique preserves the correlational structure and underlying distributions of our data, providing the adjusted 
probability we would observe our results by chance given our data and the number of tests we run. Rather than use a 
single p-value adjustment for all the outcome measures, we use a free step-down procedure to adjust the p-value on 
each outcome separately. The idea is that once a null hypothesis has been rejected, it is removed from the family of 
hypotheses being tested (thus increasing the power of the remaining tests). We then calculate a new adjusted p-value 
with the bootstrapped empirical distribution of t-statistics for only the remaining tests, providing a more powerful 
adjustment than setting all p-values to the same minimum value. 
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estimates is significant at the usual 5 percent threshold (social costs of crime committed by 
females), and another is significant at the 10 percent cutoff (achievement test scores for males 
age 0-6 at baseline). If we account for multiple testing by controlling for either the FDR or 
FWER, then none of these estimates are statistically significant at conventional cutoffs.27 
Given our reliance on mostly city- or state-level administrative records, one threat to the 
internal validity of our estimates comes from the possibility of differential attrition. Table IV 
shows that there is no difference in the treatment versus control group in the fraction of quarters 
living outside of IL between 1997 and 2005. A recent update of this data allowed us to get 
information on the location of households in 2012. Again, we see no statistically significant 
difference in the chance of living in Illinois; our 95 percent confidence interval lets us rule out an 
ITT effect any larger than about 4 percentage points.28 This result suggests that our estimates for 
the majority of our outcomes, all of which rely on state data, should not suffer from any bias. 
Such outcomes include arrest records, public assistance receipt and earnings.   
However, Table V shows that younger children in our treatment group are slightly more 
likely to be in the Chicago Public School (CPS) system in any given academic year. The ITT is 3 
(2) percentage points for boys (girls) age 0-6 at baseline. In theory, this differential attrition 
might bias our achievement estimates for the young children in our sample.29 In practice, we 
think that any bias is negligible. First, even after attrition, children in the treatment and control 
groups are nearly identical on the comprehensive set of baseline observables presented earlier 
(see Appendix Table II). Second, because there is little difference between treatment and control 
children in the rates with which they ever appear in the CPS system, we re-estimate our ITT 
                                                
27 Performing the calculation of FDR-adjusted p-values separately by gender does not affect our results. 
28 Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain address histories from 2005-2012 for this sample of households.  
29 We find that treatment children are slightly more likely to be enrolled in Medicaid over our sample period, which 
is consistent with earlier evidence that the voucher offer led to a small increase in social program participation (see 
Jacob and Ludwig 2012).   
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model replacing any missing student test scores with a student’s last observed score, which 
yields estimates very similar to those reported in Table III. We also calculate bounds using the 
approach from Lee (2009), which suggest that our results for graduation impacts are robust to 
differential attrition, although these bounds are very wide for test scores (Appendix Tables III 
and IV). A final point to note is that differential treatment-control attrition is identical for boys 
and girls (Table V). Yet vouchers appear to have (if anything) a more positive impact on boys, as 
seen in Table III, suggesting differential attrition is unlikely to be driving the result.30 
These results appear to generalize to a broader set of outcomes as well. Appendix Tables 
V to VIII show ITT and TOT estimates of a variety of additional outcome measures in each of 
our domains, in the spirit of exploratory analyses. These results suggest vouchers had few 
detectable impacts on children’s outcomes. Quantile regression estimates suggest that there were 
no consistent and significant estimates across different parts of the ability distribution.31 
It is possible that any voucher effect increases with duration of voucher receipt, which 
could be missed by our main estimates. Figure IV shows ITT estimates and confidence intervals 
by time since offer for achievement test scores and social costs of crime committed by youth. We 
do not see much trend over time in any of these outcomes or across analytic samples. 
                                                
30 Of course, it is possible that the attrition process operated differently across genders despite the identical rates of 
attrition, though this seems unlikely. 
31 One might imagine that the intervention had different impacts across different points in the ability distribution. To 
explore this possibility we estimated quantile regressions of the test score. To simplify the estimation, we collapse 
the panel to a single observation per student, averaging student test scores for all post lottery periods. We then 
estimate a cross-sectional regression where the key independent variable is an indicator for being in the treatment 
group. We show estimates of the effect of being offered a voucher (i.e., ITT estimates) on the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th 
and 90th quantiles of the test score distribution. The results suggests that, to the extent that there is any effect on 
math test scores for pre-school age boys, the results may be concentrated at the higher end of the distribution. While 
the estimates are not terribly precise, we see no significant effects below the 75th percentile, where the impact is 
0.0526 SD (Appendix Table IX). 
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B. Implications for Effects of Cash Transfers and Family Income on Child Outcomes 
The results described above suggesting that even large transfers to families through 
housing vouchers do not generate many detectable changes in children’s outcomes provide an 
initial indication that our data do not seem consistent with recent studies suggesting large effects 
of cash on children’s outcomes. This section sharpens those comparisons by using the IV 
methods described above to directly compare effects on children per $1,000 of extra income. 
Table VI presents our IV estimates for the effect of an extra $1,000 (in 2013 dollars) on 
each of our primary outcomes for each of our gender-age analysis samples. To help get some 
initial sense for the magnitudes, control means are in column 2. Column 3 presents our lower-
bound IV estimate for the effects of each extra $1,000 in cash on children’s outcomes, assuming 
that a marginal dollar spent on housing is as valuable for children’s outcomes as a marginal 
dollar spent on non-housing consumption, and so re-scales our TOT estimate by the full subsidy 
cost to the government ($12,501 on average). Column 4 presents one of our upper-bound 
estimates, assuming that housing has no effect on children, by scaling the TOT using the value of 
the cash transfer that would provide families with the same-sized increase in consumption of 
non-housing goods that they get from receiving a housing voucher ($6,377 on average). Column 
5 is an even higher upper-bound, and assumes that housing has no effect on children and that the 
income elasticity of housing is zero. It divides the TOT by an even smaller assumed cash 
equivalent to a voucher, equal to just the gain in non-housing consumption from voucher receipt 
($5,653 on average).  
The results in Table VI indicate that even the top of the confidence intervals around our 
upper-bound estimates are still much smaller than the impacts on children’s outcomes per $1,000 
reported in the recent literature. For example, the largest estimate implied by our data for the 
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impact of an extra $1,000 on young boys’ achievement test scores is roughly .011 SD with a 
standard error of .006. Our confidence intervals enable us to rule out an effect of cash on test 
scores that is any larger than 0.022 SD, about one-third the estimated effect for boys from Dahl-
Lochner and one-eighth the estimated effect for boys in Milligan-Stabile (Figure V).32  
The same pattern is true if we look at other outcomes as well, such as high school 
graduation rates (Figure VI). As noted above, Akee et al. (2010) use data from a casino opening 
on an Indian reservation and estimate that an extra $1,000 of income increases high school 
graduation rates by about 6 percentage points. Our largest IV estimates, from column 5 of Table 
VI, suggest an effect per $1,000 of extra income on high school graduation rates for boys equal 
to 0.6 percentage points, with a standard error of 0.4 percentage points; for girls the point 
estimate and standard error both equal about 0.4 percentage points. Put differently, our estimates 
let us rule out effects on high school graduation rates per thousand dollars larger than about 1.4 
percentage points, or about one-quarter the size of the estimate from Akee et al. (2010). 
An alternative approach for using our data to estimate the effect of cash transfers on 
children is to essentially estimate the reduced-form effect of a voucher on children’s outcomes 
for the subset of families in our sample for whom receipt of a housing voucher is essentially a 
cash transfer. In Table VII we present results for families whose baseline housing consumption is 
so high relative to the voucher’s rent ceiling (FMR)—either within $50 per month of the FMR, 
or actually greater than the FMR—that receipt of a housing voucher is unlikely to result in 
additional housing consumption and therefore acts like a pure cash transfer.33  
                                                
32 Impacts for achievement test scores for girls are in Appendix Figure II; our estimate is again much smaller than 
that of Dahl and Lochner, but not so different from that of Milligan and Stabile, who find little effect of cash on test 
scores for girls in their paper. 
33 The key difference being that there are more bureaucratic hurdles involved in utilizing the voucher than in cashing 
a check. To use a housing voucher to lease a given apartment, the unit must pass inspection by the local housing 
authority and the landlord must agree to rent the unit to the voucher-holder. Continued use of a voucher requires 
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Table VII shows that the results for these families are qualitatively similar to the IV 
estimates for the full sample we report in Table VI. For example, the estimates in column 6 of 
Table VII suggest that $1,000 of additional income for young boys is associated with an increase 
of 0.017 SD (standard error 0.015) on standardized achievement scores, compared to an upper-
bound IV point estimate for the full sample in Table VI of 0.011 (standard error 0.006). The 95 
percent confidence interval around our estimate for these families is significantly wider than 
when we use the full sample, since focusing just on those with baseline rents close to the voucher 
rent cap reduces the size of the analysis sample by 90 percent. But even these less precise 
estimates still let us rule out an effect on test scores any larger than about two-thirds that for boys 
from Dahl-Lochner and one-fourth that of Milligan-Stabile. Similarly, the point estimate for high 
school graduation for males in our infra-marginal sample in Table VII is no larger than about 0.5 
percentage points per $1,000 of extra income with a standard error of 1.3, compared to an IV 
estimate for the full sample that is never larger than about 0.6 percentage points with a standard 
error of 0.4. These estimates let us rule out high school graduation effects larger than about one-
half the size of the estimates presented in Akee et al. (2010). 
One candidate explanation for why our estimates are so different from what we would 
expect based on previous studies of the effects of cash transfers on children is that there are 
families in our study sample who at baseline are homeless or doubled up, for whom receipt of a 
housing voucher actually increases their out-of-pocket spending on rent and so reduces their 
consumption of other (non-housing) goods. This would lead our IV estimate to understate the 
true effects of cash on child outcomes, because we would be dividing the TOT estimate by too 
large a number (an overstated figure for the gain in non-housing consumption). The best estimate 
                                                                                                                                                       
submitting to annual reexamination of household income and composition. Termination of a voucher may also result 
in the case of drug-trafficking or violent criminal activity. 
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we have found for the share of poor families that are doubled up is about 6 percent.34 Many of 
these families may be paying housing expenses even though they are doubled up. Even if we 
make the extreme assumption that all of them pay zero rent at baseline, then about 6 percent of 
our sample would experience a reduction in consumption of non-housing goods equal to the 
amount of the required voucher rent payment, which averages $3,800 for our study sample. This 
would reduce the average gain in non-housing consumption for our study sample by just 
(.06×$3,800) ≈ $230. The share of our study sample that is both doubled-up and paying little or 
no rent at baseline and would need to be implausibly large in order to explain why our results are 
so different from those of recent studies of cash transfer programs. 
Another reason that we might expect differences in estimates across studies involves 
differences in samples and study contexts (i.e., issues of external validity). One way to assess 
this possibility is to look at the non-experimental relationship between income and child 
outcomes across studies. Using data from the year prior to the lottery in our study sample, we 
estimate an OLS regression as close to the one in Table 2, Panel A, Column 1 of Dahl and 
Lochner (2012) as we can. As shown in Figure VII, our OLS estimate of the relationship 
between $1,000 of income and student achievement is if anything somewhat larger than that 
reported in Dahl and Lochner (2012). If the relationship between family income and child 
outcomes is non-linear, then one explanation for the difference in OLS estimates is that our 
                                                
34 The Homelessness Research Institute estimates that there are 800,000 families with incomes 125 percent of the 
poverty line or less that are doubled up (http://b.3cdn.net/naeh/97569cfc8f6ecf741f_vhm6bhzcg.pdf), while the 
Census Bureau estimates that in 2012 there were 12.5 million families with incomes equal to or below 125 percent 
of the poverty line. These two figures together imply that about 6 percent of poor and near-poor families are doubled 
up. (Presumably at least some of those families are contributing something to rent even though they are doubled up; 
unfortunately we are not aware of any reliable estimates of rent contributions by this population.) While there are 
higher estimates in the literature for the number of people who are doubled up in America, these higher estimates 
include large numbers of adult children living with their parents, or grandparents living with their children and 
grandchildren, which are not relevant for our applicant pool of low-income families with children. For example, 
estimates from the Census Bureau suggest that about 19 percent of all households containing children under age 18 
lived in shared households with other adults (i.e. doubled up). (Personal communication between Laryssa Mykta, 
Census Bureau, and Patrick Wu, University of Chicago, July 17, 2013). 
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sample is more disadvantaged than theirs. If this is the case, then we would expect our main 
estimates that exploit the randomized experimental design of our voucher lottery to be larger 
than those Dahl and Lochner present using their IV design. What we actually find is the opposite. 
C. Mediating Mechanisms 
 Why do such large resource transfers as generated by our housing voucher lottery not 
generate larger gains in children’s test scores? One possibility is that parents dedicate additional 
resources to goods other than those that are widely thought to translate into improved children’s 
outcomes. Mayer (1997, p. 99) shows that, in general, when low-income families get extra 
income they tend to spend it on things like food, shelter, clothes, health care, and transportation, 
all of which are only weakly correlated with child outcomes. We do not have detailed 
consumption or expenditure data for our specific sample of families, but with the administrative 
data sources we do have available to us we can at least try to narrow down what how families are 
allocating their additional resources.  
 Table IV showed that families do not seem to be “spending” much of their extra income 
moving to neighborhoods with features that previous research suggests may be developmentally 
productive for children, such as lower rates of poverty, racial segregation, or crime. This table 
reports ITT and TOT effects of voucher receipt on different measures of neighborhood of 
residence for the 10 percent random sub-sample of CHAC applicants for whom we have passive 
tracking address data from 1997 through 2005, and in 2012. Few of the effects are statistically 
significant and the point estimates are always small in relation to the control means. In Appendix 
Table X, we show the results are not qualitatively different if we focus instead on address 
information captured by Illinois social program data, which provide annual address information 
but at the cost of covering only those families who are receiving some form of social assistance. 
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Because neighborhood “quality” is capitalized into housing prices, our results imply that families 
must be taking most of their increased housing consumption in the form of better housing units 
rather than “better” neighborhoods. 
 Tables VIII and IX show that families also do not seem to devote much of the additional 
resources they receive from a housing voucher on improved school quality for their children or 
reduced school mobility (frequent changes of a child’s school attended are a major problem in 
urban districts; see NRC/IOM 2010). Of course the most obvious way for families to access 
higher-quality schools is to move residences, so at some level these results may not be surprising 
given our finding above that families are not spending additional resources on changing 
neighborhood “types.” But because Chicago is a district with a fair amount of school choice, 
families in principle could use the additional resources provided by vouchers to move their 
children to higher-quality schools even without moving residences by, for example, buying a car.  
 Another mechanism through which vouchers may affect children is via their involvement 
in the formal labor market and participation in social programs during young adulthood. Wilson 
(1996) argues that formal work can provide structure for daily routines, while Heller (2014) 
argues that teen employment teaches young people social-cognitive skills. If voucher receipt 
reduces youth labor supply, it could potentially offset the beneficial effects of extra income on 
outcomes among the adolescents in our sample. But this explanation turns out not to be 
important in practice; Appendix Tables V through VIII show no statistically significant effects of 
vouchers on youth employment, as measured by quarterly UI earnings data from Illinois. There 
is a small increase in participation rates in a several social programs like Food Stamps. 
VII. DISCUSSION 
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 The question of whether transferring additional resources to poor families beyond what is 
currently provided by existing social safety net programs will help poor children is of first-order 
importance for public policy, given the $411 billion the U.S. spent on safety net programs in 
2012 (including $40 billion on means-tested housing programs).35 The U.S still has over 16 
million children (22 percent) living in poverty.36 Theory yields an ambiguous answer about the 
effects of such transfers on children’s human capital and long-term life outcomes. Credit 
constraints may cause poor parents to underinvest in children’s human capital. Alternatively, the 
widely documented correlation between poverty and child outcomes could reflect that whatever 
limits parents’ success in the labor market may also limit the outcomes of their children. 
Identifying the causal relationship between income and children’s outcomes has proved 
challenging despite a wealth of empirical work in economics and other social sciences on this 
question. Our study re-examines this question using a very large, randomized housing voucher 
lottery carried out in Chicago in 1997. Housing vouchers are an unusually generous social 
program by American standards, and unlike most other major social programs are rationed—the 
key to identification in our paper.  
We find no statistically significant impacts of receiving a housing voucher on any of the 
primary children’s outcomes we examine here, once we adjust our statistical inference to account 
for multiple-testing issues. Nor do we see any trends over time to suggest these impacts increase 
with the duration of voucher receipt. The findings are somewhat surprising given how generous 
vouchers are, but are nonetheless broadly consistent with those of Mills et al.’s (2006) 
randomized trial study of providing housing vouchers to families eligible for or receiving TANF. 
Their study does not find consistent effects on children’s outcomes, although they rely on parent 
                                                
35 http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=1258 
36 http://www.nccp.org/topics/childpoverty.html 
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reports on children’s outcomes (which can be error-prone), have a fairly modest sample size 
(2,481 follow-up surveys were completed), and follow families for just four years. We build on 
those findings by generating much more precise zeros using administrative data on 66,610 
separate youth with outcomes in multiple domains—schooling, crime, health—measured over a 
period of 14 years. 
The one potential source of uncertainty about the internal validity of our estimates comes 
from slightly reduced rates of migration out of Chicago or Illinois by our voucher treatment 
group compared to our control group. This generates missing data, since we measure outcomes 
using administrative records from city and state government agencies. We do not believe that the 
amount of bias caused by differential attrition is likely to be large, since the amount of extra 
“missingness” for our treatment group tends to be small, just a few percentage points at most. 
Further, there are no treatment-control differences in the likelihood of ever appearing in any of 
our data systems during the post-lottery period, which means that fairly simple imputation 
methods like using the most recent valid value for missing observations should work reasonably 
well in our application. This approach yields similar results to our main findings. 
Our results, if they are correct, also imply effects of cash transfers on children’s outcomes 
that are much smaller than those reported in several recent influential papers on this topic. We 
recognize that housing vouchers and cash transfers are not equivalent. But we can generate an 
upper bound for the effect of a cash transfer on children’s outcomes using our data by making 
the extreme assumption that additional housing consumption has no effect on children’s 
outcomes. In other words, we assume the only “active ingredient” for children’s outcomes from 
getting a housing voucher is the reduction in out-of-pocket spending towards rent families have 
to make, which on average for our sample equals $5,653—about 45 percent of the total voucher 
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subsidy cost to the government and 29 percent of average baseline income for families. Receipt 
of a voucher increases non-housing consumption for our families by 59 percent. 
Our estimates let us rule out effects of cash transfers on children’s outcomes any larger 
than about one-third those reported by Dahl and Lochner (2012) or about one-eighth those 
reported by Milligan and Stabile (2011) for boy’s test scores, or about one-fourth those reported 
by Akee et al. (2010) for high school graduation among poor families. The difference in results 
does not seem to be due to the fact that we are relying on a Chicago-specific sample while these 
other papers use data from other contexts; applying OLS to our data yields an estimate of the 
income-student achievement relationship similar to or even slightly larger than the estimate 
reported by Dahl and Lochner (2012). The results also do not seem to hinge on any of the 
assumptions we make in using the voucher lottery to instrument for a cash transfer. We find 
qualitatively similar results applying our “reduced form” voucher approach to infra-marginal 
families whose baseline rents are close to the voucher rent ceiling, for whom receiving a housing 
voucher is close to receiving a pure cash transfer. One explanation for the differences in these 
results is the difference in research designs used across the different studies. 
A different explanation is required for reconciling our findings with those of Duncan et 
al. (2011), who analyze data from several welfare-to-work experiments and find impacts of extra 
income of similar size to those reported by Dahl and Lochner (2012). We think our results are 
not in conflict with those of Duncan et al., given that they are estimated using a different 
“treatment.” Housing vouchers, like any lump-sum cash transfer or social program that reduces 
benefit amounts as families receive more earned income, generate some slight reduction in 
parental labor supply. So our study answers the question of what happens when children receive 
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more income together with more parental time. The welfare-to-work experiments studied by 
Duncan et al. (2011) provide children with more income together with less parental time. 
As we argue in Appendix C, if children’s human capital is produced through a mix of 
parental time and market goods, then the effect of any transfer program on parental labor supply 
is an important moderator of its effect on children’s outcomes, shaping how parents spend extra 
income. For example, while Mayer (1997) finds that most low-income parents devote extra 
income to things like food, shelter, clothes, health care, and transportation, Duncan et al. find in 
their welfare-to-work experiments that mothers of preschool-age children, who are pushed to 
work far more hours, wind up devoting a sizable share of their extra income to buying center-
based care. Support for the view comes from findings by Morris, Gennetian, and Duncan (2005), 
who note that much of the relationship between income and child outcomes in the welfare-to-
work experiments is explained away after controlling for use of early childhood center care. 
Additional support for our hypothesis comes from the fact that only pre-school-age children 
show gains in outcomes from extra income in their study; elementary school children show few 
gains while adolescents actually show a reduction in test scores when parents get more income 
(Morris, Duncan, and Rodriguez 2004; Morris, Duncan, and Clark-Kauffman, 2005). 
Our results are consistent with those of Mayer (1997), who concludes there is “little 
reason to expect that policies to increase the income of poor families alone will substantially 
improve their children’s life chances” (p. 14). More promising may be strategies to directly 
change whatever else it is about home environments that affects children’s outcomes, or perhaps 
more promising still, educational interventions that provide children with whatever they are not 
able to receive from their households and neighborhoods. Figure VIII, for example, compares the 
effects on boy’s test scores per $1,000 cash implied by our data to the gains in test scores from 
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several leading educational interventions: Head Start; class size reduction in grades K-3 from the 
Tennessee STAR experiment; and the Success for All school-reform model, all of which have 
point estimates that imply larger effects per dollar than the intervention we study (recognizing 
the uncertainty bands around these estimates are sometimes wide and overlapping). One general 
concern with this sort of comparison is that cash transfers are what Mayer calls a “multi-
purpose” intervention that can change multiple outcomes. But our results suggest the impacts of 
extra cash appear to be small across multiple key domains such as schooling, crime, and health. 
Our findings do not imply that cash transfers or other anti-poverty programs like housing 
vouchers are not worth supporting. These programs surely improve the well-being of families in 
a variety of critical ways. Nor do our results imply that eliminating the existing social safety net 
in the US would not harm children’s outcomes, since the effects of income on children’s 
outcomes are surely non-linear, and our data come from estimating the effects of adding income 
supplementary to existing safety net supports. But our results do suggest, consistent with the 
arguments in Currie (2006), that if the goal is to improve children’s human capital outcomes, 
rather than provide families with larger cash transfers and hope those translate into what children 
need, a better strategy may be to invest in interventions that provide what children need directly. 
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Figure I: Budget constraint and consumption with and without housing voucher 
 
 
 Without a housing voucher, the family’s budget constraint is given by DJ with initial 
consumption bundle B. Receipt of a housing voucher leads to new budget constraint 
DUVL, where (D – CV) is the rent contribution required by the housing voucher program, 
HV is essentially the maximum rent allowable under the housing voucher program (the 
Fair Market Rent; in some versions of the voucher program families can lease units with 
higher rents but for simplicity we assume here this is a maximum rent). V is the new 
consumption bundle for a family that uses a voucher to lease a unit with rent at the 
maximum allowable level, which leads to more housing consumption than a family 
would choose if instead given a cash transfer with the same cost to the government (S). 
 
  
Figure II: Distribution of change in housing consumption among leased-up sample 
 
  
Figure shows the distribution of the change in housing consumption from receipt of a 
housing voucher. Baseline rent is estimated using a special tabulation of 2000 Census 
data from Chicago and assumes that families in our study sample have the same average 
rents as other, demographically-similar households in the same baseline census tracts (see 
Appendix D). First voucher rent is measured using HUD 50058 forms, which all families 
in means-tested housing programs are required to complete each year (or whenever they 
relocate). All figures converted to constant 2013 dollars.  
Figure III: Calculating value of cash transfer that would lead to same change in 
consumption of non-housing goods as families experience with a housing voucher 
 
 
  
Cash transfer S* leads to same change in consumption of non-housing goods (CV – CB) as 
families would experience if they receive a housing voucher worth S to the government. 
One of our model specifications in the tables below assumes (conservatively) that 
housing consumption has no effect on children’s outcomes, and uses an indicator for 
randomly-assigned voucher offer as an instrument for non-housing consumption (S*) to 
estimate the change in children’s outcomes for a $1,000 gain in family income.  
Figure IV: Estimated intention to treat effects on children’s achievement test scores 
and criminal activity, by year from housing voucher offer 
 
  
Each panel of the figure presents the results from estimating a separate regression where 
the dependent variable is either achievement test scores in math and reading from 
Chicago Public School student-level records (panels A and B) or the monetized value of 
the criminal activity youth commit (panels C and D). The explanatory variables of 
interest are a series of indicator variables for whether a given child-year observation is (k) 
years from when the child’s family is offered a housing voucher, where (k) takes on both 
positive values (post-voucher offer) and negative values (pre-voucher offer). The figures 
present the regression coefficients on these indicator variables, together with the 95% 
confidence intervals. Note that because our dataset consists of child-year observations 
that are all after the randomized housing voucher lottery occurred, the coefficients on pre-
voucher-offer years represent tests of whether there are behavioral “anticipation effects” 
rather than a test of whether randomization was carried out correctly. 
  
Figure V: Effects of Cash Transfers on Test Scores of Young Males Across Studies 
 
 Figure reports the effects on children’s achievement test scores per $1,000 change in 
family income (in 2013 dollars). The estimate from Jacob, Kapustin and Ludwig is for 
males 0-6 at baseline taken from Table VI, column 5, using as the dependent variable an 
average of reading and math achievement test scores from Chicago Public Schools 
student-level school records. The estimate from Dahl and Lochner (2012) is also for an 
average of reading and math test scores, taken from their Table 6 for males (equal to 
0.088 standard deviations in their paper reported in 2000 constant dollars, and equal to 
0.065 when we update to 2013 dollars). Estimate from Milligan and Stabile (2011) is for 
math scores for males, taken from their Table 3, equal to 0.23 standard deviations in their 
paper for a $1,000 change in Canadian 2004 dollars, and equal to 0.177 when we update 
to 2013 US dollars. 
 
 
  
Figure VI: Effects of Cash Transfer on High School Graduation Rates Across 
Studies 
 
  
Figure reports the effects on high school graduation probabilities per $1,000 change in 
family income (in 2013 dollars). The estimate from Jacob, Kapustin and Ludwig is for 
males 6-18 at baseline taken from Table VI, column 5, using as the dependent variable an 
indicator for whether the youth graduated from high school during our study period 
according to Chicago Public Schools student-level school records. Estimate from Akee et 
al. (2010) is for males is based on their Table 5, column 2; the marginal effect here 
corresponds to a 32 percentage point change in high school graduation rates from a 
$4,000 change in family income in 1996-2002 dollars, or 8 percentage points per $1,000. 
The effect equals 5.8 percentage points per $1,000 when we update to 2013 dollars. 
  
Figure VII: OLS Estimate of Income-Test Score Relationship Across Studies 
 
  
Figure reports the cross-sectional relationship between family income, measured in 
thousands of 2013 dollars, and children’s achievement test scores. The estimate from 
Jacob, Kapustin and Ludwig is for a sample of all children ages 8-14 in July 1997 in 
households living in private market housing at baseline that participated in the lottery 
(including those from households with lottery numbers between 18,110 and 35,000). The 
dependent variable is an average of reading and math achievement test scores in the 
1997-8 academic school year from Chicago Public Schools student-level school records. 
Family income encompasses UI earnings, tax refunds or liabilities, TANF, and food 
stamp benefit levels in 1996:Q3 through 1997:Q2. Additional controls include gender; 
indicators for having 1, 2, or 3+ siblings; race; age; household head’s age; and the 
number of adults in the household. The resulting point estimate and standard error 
clustered at the household level are 0.0063 (0.0006). This attempts to replicate as closely 
as possible using our data the result in Dahl and Lochner (2012), Table 2, Column 1, 
equal to 0.0047 standard deviations per $1,000 of income reported in 2000 constant 
dollars, and equal to 0.0035 standard deviations when updated to 2013 dollars. 
Figure VIII 
 
  
Figure reports the effects on children’s achievement test scores per $1,000 (in 2013 
dollars). The estimate from Jacob, Kapustin and Ludwig is for males 0-6 at baseline taken 
from Table VI, column 5, using as the dependent variable an average of reading and math 
achievement test scores from Chicago Public Schools student-level school records. The 
Head Start estimate is the median TOT for 4-year olds from Ludwig and Phillips (2008), 
Table 1 (equal to 0.164 standard deviations in their paper per $9,000 in 2006 dollars, and 
to 0.0158 standard deviations per $1,000 in 2013 dollars). The K-3 class size reduction 
estimate is from the analysis of the Tennessee STAR experiment and its effect on black 
children in Schanzenbach (2007), Table 4 (equal to 0.242 standard deviations in the 
original study per $10,120 in 2000 dollars, and to 0.018 standard deviations per $1,000 in 
2013 dollars). Finally, the Success For All estimate is the effect on math scores from 
Borman and Hewes (2002), Table 4 (equal to 0.036 standard deviations in their paper per 
$1,000 in 2000 dollars, and to 0.027 standard deviations per $1,000 in 2013 dollars).
Table I: Baseline Characteristics of Treatment and Control Group Households and Children
Control
Group All p-value Compliers Non-Compliers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Household Level
HHH: Male 0.035 0.040 0.068 * 0.024 0.062
HHH: Black 0.942 0.944 0.501 0.959 0.924
HHH: Hispanic 0.035 0.032 0.224 0.025 0.041
HHH: White 0.020 0.022 0.425 0.014 0.033
HHH: Other race 0.003 0.002 0.342 0.002 0.002
HHH: Has spouse 0.082 0.084 0.695 0.070 0.101
# Adults in Household (Based on CHAC file) 1.419 1.416 0.813 1.376 1.470
# of kids 0-18 in HH (Based on CHAC file) 2.953 2.927 0.424 2.991 2.839
Age of HHH 31.634 31.568 0.564 30.859 32.525
Indicated interest in certificate as well as voucher program 0.799 0.801 0.786 0.799 0.803
Reported receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits 0.172 0.178 0.320 0.189 0.164
Time (in days) of application since application opened 9.290 9.304 0.834 8.985 9.732
HH total income (2013 $) 1996:III to 1997:II 18,938.000 19,084.922 0.386 18,461.211 19,925.102
HHH income (2013 $) 1997:II 1,934.589 2,007.974 0.079 * 1,718.751 2,397.575
HHH employed 1997:II 0.462 0.469 0.350 0.456 0.486
HHH receiving TANF 1997:II 0.625 0.606 0.007 *** 0.669 0.522
HHH receiving TANF, Med, or FS 1997:II 0.782 0.769 0.025 ** 0.831 0.686
HHH: # of prior violent crime arrests 0.149 0.144 0.539 0.149 0.137
HHH: # of prior property crime arrests 0.271 0.228 0.011 ** 0.235 0.219
HHH: # of prior drug crime arrests 0.128 0.126 0.793 0.124 0.129
HHH: # of prior other crime arrests 0.192 0.178 0.229 0.178 0.179
Census tract % black 0.822 0.824 0.694 0.849 0.791
Census tract poverty rate 0.302 0.301 0.499 0.310 0.288
Property crime rate (beat-level, per 1,000) in 1997 74.401 74.642 0.651 75.087 74.008
Violent crime rate (beat-level, per 1,000) in 1997 38.593 38.686 0.781 39.721 37.208
Monthy rent (2013 $) 782.067 778.106 0.318 777.027 779.644
Monthly fair market rent (2013 $) 1,316.330 1,314.109 0.575 1,319.951 1,306.240
Child Level
Male 0.500 0.505 0.234 0.506 0.504
Black 0.942 0.945 0.340 0.959 0.926
Hispanic 0.035 0.032 0.208 0.025 0.041
Age 8.478 8.546 0.201 8.247 8.947
# of prior violent crime arrests 0.010 0.009 0.654 0.008 0.011
# of prior property crime arrests 0.005 0.005 0.895 0.004 0.005
# of prior drug crime arrests 0.015 0.018 0.097 * 0.016 0.021
# of prior other crime arrests 0.011 0.012 0.762 0.009 0.015
Enrolled in the Chicago Public Schools Pre-Lottery 0.598 0.599 0.824 0.604 0.592
Math Test Score in Year Prior to Lottery -0.244 -0.215 0.068 * -0.243 -0.177
Reading Test Score in Year Prior to Lottery -0.213 -0.189 0.126 -0.198 -0.177
GPA in Year Prior to Lottery 1.518 1.563 0.129 1.531 1.601
# of Absences Prior to Lottery 28.921 28.622 0.666 28.774 28.437
Fraction Black in child's school 0.848 0.853 0.220 0.871 0.829
Fraction Latino in child's school 0.108 0.103 0.151 0.092 0.119
Fraction eligible for free-lunch in child's school 0.855 0.854 0.654 0.861 0.846
Average test score in child's school -0.182 -0.178 0.445 -0.187 -0.166
N (Children) 48,263 18,347 10,530 7,817
N (Households) 22,447 8,560 4,787 3,773
Joint test, all coefficients (including missing indicators)
Chi-squared statistic (clustering at HH level) 51.629
p-value 0.488
Notes: Unit of analysis in the top panel is the household; in the bottom panel, the child.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Treatment Group
Table II: Housing Voucher Effect on Lease-Up
Leased Using
Any Voucher 1997 CHAC Voucher
Current Current
Period Ever Period Ever
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample
Treatment group 0.4910*** 0.5432***
(0.0064) (0.0062)
Offered voucher in current or prior year 0.4774*** 0.5199***
(0.0062) (0.0060)
Control Mean 0.0705 0.0860 0.0000 0.0000
# observations 932,540 66,610 932,540 66,610
Males age 0-6 at baseline
Treatment group 0.5090*** 0.5759***
(0.0103) (0.0098)
Offered voucher in current or prior year 0.4964*** 0.5515***
(0.0100) (0.0095)
Control Mean 0.0852 0.1030 0.0000 0.0000
# observations 172,032 12,288 172,032 12,288
Males age 6-18 at baseline
Treatment group 0.4824*** 0.5255***
(0.0087) (0.0083)
Offered voucher in current or prior year 0.4692*** 0.5036***
(0.0084) (0.0081)
Control Mean 0.0625 0.0763 0.0000 0.0000
# observations 295,568 21,112 295,568 21,112
Females age 0-6 at baseline
Treatment group 0.5088*** 0.5693***
(0.0105) (0.0101)
Offered voucher in current or prior year 0.4971*** 0.5471***
(0.0101) (0.0097)
Control Mean 0.0788 0.0966 0.0000 0.0000
# observations 167,790 11,985 167,790 11,985
Females age 6-18 at baseline
Treatment group 0.4800*** 0.5284***
(0.0087) (0.0083)
Offered voucher in current or prior year 0.4645*** 0.5039***
(0.0084) (0.0081)
Control Mean 0.0653 0.0799 0.0000 0.0000
# observations 297,150 21,225 297,150 21,225
Notes: Columns 1 and 3 are ITT estimates from panel data observations. Columns 2 and 4 are
ITT estimates from cross-sectional observations. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are
clustered at the household level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table III: Housing Voucher Effects on Education, Criminal Behavior, and Health
ITT Estimate
Adjusted p-value
Gender Baseline Age Outcome Individuals CM ITT IV CCM p-value FWER FDR Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Male Age 0 to 6 Test score 8,659 -0.3339 0.0369* 0.0634* -0.3774 0.052 0.449 0.311 51,339
(0.0190) (0.0325)
Male Age 6 to 18 Test score 14,348 -0.3248 0.0068 0.0126 -0.3641 0.655 0.919 0.873 68,787
(0.0152) (0.0273)
Male Age 6 to 18 High school graduation 13,183 0.3940 0.0150 0.0286 0.4124 0.109 0.650 0.328 13,183
(0.0094) (0.0178)
Male All Soc. costs, most conservative 33,400 3,084.2100 -160.6255 -344.0462* 3,481.5526 0.102 0.650 0.328 283,091
(98.2894) (206.0899)
Male Age 0 to 6 Inpatient or emergency claim 9,538 0.2449 -0.0012 -0.0014 0.2421 0.852 0.919 0.920 52,378
(0.0063) (0.0114)
Male Age 6 to 18 Inpatient or emergency claim 12,526 0.2471 -0.0059 -0.0105 0.2547 0.324 0.896 0.556 56,480
(0.0060) (0.0112)
Female Age 0 to 6 Test score 8,488 -0.1446 0.0019 0.0029 -0.1511 0.919 0.919 0.920 52,107
(0.0183) (0.0316)
Female Age 6 to 18 Test score 14,855 -0.1479 0.0168 0.0300 -0.2082 0.240 0.880 0.556 73,389
(0.0143) (0.0273)
Female Age 6 to 18 High school graduation 13,792 0.5766 0.0101 0.0190 0.5846 0.279 0.892 0.556 13,792
(0.0094) (0.0176)
Female All Soc. costs, most conservative 33,210 573.6593 60.8371** 121.0684* 634.7744 0.043 0.425 0.311 284,057
(30.0558) (63.1189)
Female Age 0 to 6 Inpatient or emergency claim 9,379 0.2119 0.0018 0.0032 0.2202 0.767 0.919 0.920 50,549
(0.0062) (0.0113)
Female Age 6 to 18 Inpatient or emergency claim 16,050 0.3702 0.0025 0.0047 0.3823 0.653 0.919 0.873 75,526
(0.0056) (0.0108)
Notes: Unit of observation is the person-year for all outcomes, except high school graduation which is a person-level cross-section. CM = control mean. 
ITT = intent-to-treat. IV = instrumental variables. CCM = control complier mean. See text for discussion of these estimates. FWER = family-wise error rate. FDR = false
discovery rate. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the household level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table IV: Housing Voucher Effect on Geographic Outcomes (10% Sample)
1997-2005 Addresses 2012 Address, 2009 Outcomes
Individuals CM ITT IV CCM Obs. Individuals CM ITT IV CCM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Has Address on File 6,509 0.897 0.0067 0.0141 0.891 214,797 6,493 0.863 -0.0117 -0.0241 0.896
(0.0082) (0.0173) (0.0168) (0.0346)
Miles from Baseline Address 5,437 63.243 9.1904 18.4862 34.647
(11.6729) (23.5552)
Living in IL 6,509 0.956 0.0041 0.0085 0.972 192,862 5,586 0.862 0.0085 0.0171 0.909
(0.0072) (0.0151) (0.0169) (0.0339)
Fraction of Quarters Outside IL 6,509 0.0471 -0.0064 -0.0132 0.0307 6,509
(0.0071) (0.0146)
Living in Cook County, IL 5,586 0.796 0.0145 0.0292 0.852
(0.0193) (0.0387)
Poverty Rate > 20%1,2 6,433 0.655 -0.0088 -0.0184 0.712 184,355 4,461 0.688 -0.0374 -0.0698 0.703
(0.0176) (0.0362) (0.0248) (0.0461)
Poverty Rate1,2 6,433 0.273 0.0039 0.0075 0.274 184,355 4,461 0.289 -0.0076 -0.0142 0.292
(0.0055) (0.0112) (0.0080) (0.0150)
Fraction Black1,2 6,433 0.794 0.0012 0.0023 0.837 184,463 4,461 0.760 -0.0011 -0.0020 0.789
(0.0084) (0.0172) (0.0155) (0.0290)
Social Capital1,3 6,038 3.495 -0.0056 -0.0109 3.501 164,284 3,659 3.776 0.0187 0.0345 3.769
(0.0057) (0.0114) (0.0137) (0.0253)
Collective Efficacy1,3 6,038 3.761 -0.0158** -0.0312** 3.772 164,284 3,659 3.502 0.0177* 0.0326* 3.491
(0.0078) (0.0155) (0.0096) (0.0177)
Violent Crime Rate (per 1,000)4 6,038 17.633 -0.0896 -0.1920 17.865 164,277 3,658 25.142 0.1358 0.2508 24.964
(0.3026) (0.5998) (0.6984) (1.2904)
Property Crime Rate (per 1,000)4 6,038 75.479 -3.1948*** -6.2988*** 77.120 164,277 3,658 60.185 0.5016 0.9263 59.530
(0.9911) (1.9753) (1.3479) (2.4904)
Notes: Unit of observation in columns 1-5 (with the exception of "Fraction of Quarters Outside IL") is the person-quarter. Unit of observation in columns 7-11 is the person.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the household level.
1 Measured at the Census tract level.
2 Data from the decennial 1990 and 2000 censuses and the American Community Surveys for 2005-9 (interpolating values for inter-censal years).
3 Data from the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHCDN) Community Survey.
4 Data from annual beat-level crime panel from the Chicago Police Department.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table V: Housing Voucher Effect on Enrollment in Chicago Public Schools and Medicaid
Effect of Voucher Offer (ITT)
Males Females
Age 0-6 Age 6-18 Age 0-6 Age 6-18
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ever Enrolled in CPS during 1998-2011 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0014
(0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0014) (0.0019)
[0.845] [0.812] [0.843] [0.820]
12,288 21,112 11,985 21,225
Ever Left CPS (Moved or Enrolled in Private) -0.0399*** -0.0115* -0.0225** -0.0117**
(0.0092) (0.0061) (0.0095) (0.0059)
[0.278] [0.223] [0.266] [0.201]
12,288 21,112 11,985 21,225
Enrolled in CPS in Current Academic Year 0.0328*** 0.0068** 0.0203*** 0.0151***
(0.0067) (0.0032) (0.0068) (0.0031)
[0.505] [0.324] [0.509] [0.334]
172,032 295,568 167,790 297,150
Tested in Current Academic Year 0.0277*** 0.0052* 0.0239*** 0.0130***
(0.0056) (0.0027) (0.0057) (0.0027)
[0.299] [0.235] [0.311] [0.250]
172,032 295,568 167,790 297,150
Ever Enrolled in Medicaid during 2000-2008 0.0008 0.0077 0.0025 0.0096
(0.0091) (0.0076) (0.0094) (0.0070)
[0.776] [0.591] [0.783] [0.754]
12,288 21,112 11,985 21,225
Enrolled in Medicaid in Current Academic Year 0.0108 0.0113** 0.0145* 0.0112*
(0.0086) (0.0052) (0.0088) (0.0058)
[0.471] [0.295] [0.466] [0.394]
110,592 190,008 107,865 191,025
Notes: Order of results: ITT estimate; standard error (parentheses); control mean (brackets); number of
observations. Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table VI: Estimated Effects of Cash Transfers on Education, Criminal Behavior, and Health
Implied Voucher Value
Gender Baseline Age Outcome Individuals CM S S* ΔC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Male Age 0 to 6 Test score 8,659 -0.3339 0.0050* 0.0084* 0.0107*
(0.0026) (0.0043) (0.0055)
Male Age 6 to 18 Test score 14,348 -0.3248 0.0010 0.0019 0.0021
(0.0022) (0.0042) (0.0047)
Male Age 6 to 18 High school graduation 13,183 0.3940 0.0029 0.0065 0.0064
(0.0018) (0.0041) (0.0040)
Male All Soc. costs, most conservative 33,400 3,084.2100 -27.2071* -58.5617* -60.4924*
(16.4252) (35.5156) (36.5396)
Male Age 0 to 6 Inpatient or emergency claim 9,538 0.2449 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003
(0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0019)
Male Age 6 to 18 Inpatient or emergency claim 12,526 0.2471 -0.0009 -0.0017 -0.0019
(0.0009) (0.0018) (0.0020)
Female Age 0 to 6 Test score 8,488 -0.1446 0.0003 0.0004 0.0007
(0.0025) (0.0042) (0.0054)
Female Age 6 to 18 Test score 14,855 -0.1479 0.0024 0.0046 0.0052
(0.0021) (0.0042) (0.0047)
Female Age 6 to 18 High school graduation 13,792 0.5766 0.0020 0.0045 0.0044
(0.0018) (0.0042) (0.0041)
Female All Soc. costs, most conservative 33,210 573.6593 9.8595** 21.5006** 22.0343**
(5.0053) (10.9255) (11.1743)
Female Age 0 to 6 Inpatient or emergency claim 9,379 0.2119 0.0003 0.0004 0.0006
(0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0019)
Female Age 6 to 18 Inpatient or emergency claim 16,050 0.3702 0.0004 0.0008 0.0008
(0.0009) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Notes: Unit of observation is the person-year for all outcomes, except high school graduation which is a person-level cross-section.
IV estimates shown are re-scaled by the implied value of the voucher--S, S*, or ΔC--in thousands of 2013 $. S is the total cost to the
government of the housing voucher subsidy, equal to $12,501 on average for our study sample. S* is the cash transfer that would
generate the same increase in non-housing consumption as does a housing voucher, equal to $6,377 on average for our study sample;
see text for calculation. ΔC is the increase in non-housing consumption from receiving a housing voucher, equal to $5,653 on average
for our study sample. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the household level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table VII: Estimated Effects of Cash Transfers on Education, Criminal Behavior, and Health for Inframarginal Households
Baseline Rent > FMR - $50 Baseline Rent > FMR
Gender Baseline Age Outcome Individuals CM Subsidy = ΔC Individuals CM Subsidy = ΔC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male Age 0 to 6 Test score 490 -0.2424 0.0145 338 -0.2519 0.0166
(0.0116) (0.0147)
Male Age 6 to 18 Test score 720 -0.2616 -0.0007 498 -0.2725 -0.0080
(0.0096) (0.0109)
Male Age 6 to 18 High school graduation 661 0.4134 0.0013 461 0.4387 0.0050
(0.0101) (0.0125)
Male All Soc. costs, most conservative 1,752 2,925.5025 -78.6808 1,221 2,859.1061 -152.7635**
(67.1669) (69.3798)
Male Age 0 to 6 Inpatient or emergency claim 543 0.2613 -0.0018 382 0.2676 -0.0063
(0.0040) (0.0043)
Male Age 6 to 18 Inpatient or emergency claim 633 0.2367 0.0008 441 0.2204 0.0075
(0.0035) (0.0046)
Female Age 0 to 6 Test score 484 -0.0146 -0.0045 328 0.0490 -0.0255*
(0.0119) (0.0143)
Female Age 6 to 18 Test score 755 -0.0668 -0.0158 543 -0.0849 -0.0240*
(0.0127) (0.0144)
Female Age 6 to 18 High school graduation 702 0.6357 -0.0052 505 0.6589 -0.0065
(0.0095) (0.0108)
Female All Soc. costs, most conservative 1,757 642.5750 5.8208 1,220 593.6785 7.3000
(26.5180) (31.1000)
Female Age 0 to 6 Inpatient or emergency claim 532 0.2426 0.0010 360 0.2446 -0.0007
(0.0035) (0.0043)
Female Age 6 to 18 Inpatient or emergency claim 776 0.3716 -0.0006 537 0.3824 -0.0069
(0.0043) (0.0045)
Notes: Unit of observation is the person-year for all outcomes, except high school graduation which is a person-level cross-section. IV estimates shown are 
re-scaled by the non-housing value of the voucher (ΔC) in thousands of 2013 $. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the
household level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table VIII: Housing Voucher Effects on Child's School Characteristics
Outcome Individuals CM ITT IV CCM Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Males age 0-6 at baseline
Missing school demographics 10,374 0.0159 0.0011 0.0019 0.0133 92,043
(0.0017) (0.0030)
Fraction black 10,341 0.8495 0.0015 0.0028 0.8679 90,561
(0.0046) (0.0081)
Fraction Latino 10,341 0.1173 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.1037 90,561
(0.0038) (0.0066)
Fraction with subsidized lunch 10,341 0.8698 0.0009 0.0016 0.8637 90,561
(0.0018) (0.0031)
Fraction special education 10,341 0.1286 -0.0028*** -0.0048*** 0.1335 90,561
(0.0010) (0.0017)
Total enrollment 10,341 768.2978 17.2501** 30.8500** 744.2949 90,561
(7.0679) (12.3332)
Average test score 10,341 -0.1981 0.0035 0.0062 -0.2274 90,561
(0.0058) (0.0100)
Males age 6-18 at baseline
Missing school demographics 17,168 0.0274 -0.0009 -0.0018 0.0267 102,794
(0.0024) (0.0045)
Fraction black 17,005 0.8281 0.0005 0.0007 0.8464 99,998
(0.0043) (0.0079)
Fraction Latino 17,005 0.1275 -0.0011 -0.0019 0.1181 99,998
(0.0034) (0.0063)
Fraction with subsidized lunch 17,005 0.8528 -0.0010 -0.0020 0.8485 99,998
(0.0019) (0.0034)
Fraction special education 17,005 0.1433 -0.0010 -0.0019 0.1534 99,998
(0.0012) (0.0021)
Total enrollment 17,005 965.2989 2.2003 4.7429 1,004.0393 99,998
(8.4074) (15.4892)
Average test score 17,005 -0.2109 0.0006 0.0019 -0.2515 99,998
(0.0052) (0.0095)
Females age 0-6 at baseline
Missing school demographics 10,096 0.0127 -0.0006 -0.0010 0.0119 90,004
(0.0012) (0.0022)
Fraction black 10,053 0.8502 0.0075 0.0134 0.8678 88,883
(0.0048) (0.0084)
Fraction Latino 10,053 0.1159 -0.0050 -0.0090 0.1012 88,883
(0.0040) (0.0070)
Fraction with subsidized lunch 10,053 0.8677 0.0006 0.0010 0.8609 88,883
(0.0019) (0.0034)
Fraction special education 10,053 0.1245 -0.0010 -0.0018 0.1282 88,883
(0.0009) (0.0015)
Total enrollment 10,053 787.9906 -3.2201 -6.2892 796.8033 88,883
(7.1769) (12.6614)
Average test score 10,053 -0.1800 -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.1955 88,883
(0.0061) (0.0108)
Table VIII: Housing Voucher Effects on Child's School Characteristics
Outcome Individuals CM ITT IV CCM Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Females age 6-18 at baseline
Missing school demographics 17,336 0.0159 -0.0008 -0.0017 0.0182 104,514
(0.0017) (0.0033)
Fraction black 17,274 0.8281 -0.0051 -0.0100 0.8454 102,860
(0.0044) (0.0086)
Fraction Latino 17,274 0.1259 0.0067* 0.0134* 0.1127 102,860
(0.0036) (0.0070)
Fraction with subsidized lunch 17,274 0.8564 0.0004 0.0010 0.8493 102,860
(0.0017) (0.0034)
Fraction special education 17,274 0.1364 0.0012 0.0023 0.1468 102,860
(0.0010) (0.0019)
Total enrollment 17,274 1,005.9582 -0.6216 -1.7242 1,061.2455 102,860
(9.1214) (17.7645)
Average test score 17,274 -0.1789 -0.0045 -0.0089 -0.2128 102,860
(0.0054) (0.0105)
Notes: Unit of observation is the person-year for all outcomes. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered 
at the household level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table IX: Housing Voucher Effects on School Moving
Outcome Individuals CM ITT IV CCM Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Males age 0-6 at baseline
School moves 9,888 0.2585 0.0074 0.0132* 0.2633 80,983
(0.0045) (0.0078)
School moves (involuntary) 9,888 0.1146 0.0014 0.0026 0.1088 80,983
(0.0019) (0.0033)
School moves (voluntary) 9,888 0.1439 0.0060 0.0105 0.1545 80,983
(0.0040) (0.0070)
Miles from baseline address to school 9,730 2.9078 0.2053** 0.3609** 2.8576 86,748
(0.0827) (0.1437)
Miles from current address to school 8,243 2.7543 0.1204 0.2093 2.7041 60,057
(0.0930) (0.1596)
Missing school move data 9,964 0.0223 0.0008 0.0015 0.0020 82,806
(0.0006) (0.0011)
Missing baseline address to school data 10,374 0.0575 0.0015 0.0028 0.0501 92,043
(0.0015) (0.0027)
Missing current address to school data 10,374 0.3414 0.0274*** 0.0486*** 0.3199 92,043
(0.0099) (0.0172)
Males age 6-18 at baseline
School moves 16,710 0.2740 0.0062 0.0115 0.2874 98,682
(0.0040) (0.0073)
School moves (involuntary) 16,710 0.1289 0.0014 0.0021 0.1529 98,682
(0.0020) (0.0038)
School moves (voluntary) 16,710 0.1451 0.0048 0.0094 0.1344 98,682
(0.0036) (0.0066)
Miles from baseline address to school 16,110 2.6321 0.3251*** 0.5820*** 2.6727 96,226
(0.0707) (0.1286)
Miles from current address to school 13,197 2.2226 0.3793*** 0.6959*** 2.1350 68,459
(0.0882) (0.1634)
Missing school move data 16,834 0.0060 0.0001 0.0002 0.0014 99,284
(0.0005) (0.0010)
Missing baseline address to school data 17,168 0.0648 0.0018 0.0033 0.0550 102,794
(0.0022) (0.0040)
Missing current address to school data 17,168 0.3336 0.0080 0.0170 0.3456 102,794
(0.0093) (0.0169)
Females age 0-6 at baseline
School moves 9,575 0.2497 0.0108** 0.0196** 0.2514 79,257
(0.0045) (0.0079)
School moves (involuntary) 9,575 0.1158 -0.0004 -0.0003 0.1085 79,257
(0.0019) (0.0034)
School moves (voluntary) 9,575 0.1339 0.0112*** 0.0199*** 0.1429 79,257
(0.0040) (0.0070)
Miles from baseline address to school 9,472 2.8560 0.2469*** 0.4419*** 2.9567 85,273
(0.0789) (0.1380)
Miles from current address to school 8,105 2.7384 0.1675* 0.3129* 2.8259 58,877
(0.0909) (0.1640)
Missing school move data 9,648 0.0223 0.0003 0.0006 0.0046 81,055
(0.0006) (0.0011)
Missing baseline address to school data 10,096 0.0541 -0.0010 -0.0017 0.0446 90,004
(0.0009) (0.0015)
Table IX: Housing Voucher Effects on School Moving
Outcome Individuals CM ITT IV CCM Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Missing current address to school data 10,096 0.3455 0.0081 0.0152 0.3582 90,004
(0.0096) (0.0170)
Females age 6-18 at baseline
School moves 17,048 0.2633 0.0155*** 0.0309*** 0.2667 101,039
(0.0040) (0.0078)
School moves (involuntary) 17,048 0.1262 0.0021 0.0037 0.1475 101,039
(0.0019) (0.0038)
School moves (voluntary) 17,048 0.1372 0.0134*** 0.0272*** 0.1192 101,039
(0.0037) (0.0071)
Miles from baseline address to school 16,450 2.6933 0.1637** 0.3252** 2.9493 99,203
(0.0739) (0.1426)
Miles from current address to school 13,425 2.1993 0.2345*** 0.4612*** 2.3640 69,667
(0.0850) (0.1646)
Missing school move data 17,143 0.0053 0.0001 0.0001 0.0009 101,590
(0.0005) (0.0011)
Missing baseline address to school data 17,336 0.0489 -0.0009 -0.0020 0.0651 104,514
(0.0013) (0.0025)
Missing current address to school data 17,336 0.3340 -0.0047 -0.0068 0.3616 104,514
(0.0093) (0.0178)
Notes: Unit of observation is the person-year for all outcomes. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered 
at the household level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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